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The Cultural Effects of the Narcoeconomy in Rural Mexico

James H. McDonald, Ph. D.
Southern Utah University
mcdonaldj@suu.edu

Abstract
This essay describes the cultural effects of drug trafficking on a town in rural Mexico. A
variety of ethnographic scenes reveal the rapidly changing social imagination as new forms
of consumption create new opportunities for identity formation. However, because these
new consumer forms are expensive, and therefore inaccessible to the majority of community
members, a type of cultural exclusion is at work. In this ordinary town, there are
extraordinary forms of consumption: large, lavish houses; high-stakes gambling at local
cockfights; a new urban-oriented consumer culture; and new farmer entrepreneurs. All were
underwritten by narco-activities. These new forms of consumption challenge and subvert
older, stable forms of hierarchy and status. Individuals with access to these forms of
consumption have new types of economic, cultural and social capital privilege, and such
access legitimizes their status and power. The article closes by considering the implications
of the rising levels of violence in Mexico’s interior and the potential that we are seeing the
initial stages of a civil war.
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Introduction
This essay analyzes the cultural effects of the penetration of the narcoeconomy into a
seemingly pedestrian, rural community in the West-Central Mexican state of Michoacán. It
builds upon and updates ethnographic work that explored this penetration as an incipient
phenomenon (McDonald, 2005) in which new forms of cultural and social capital emerged or old
ones were co-opted by participants in the drug trafficking trade. This data is re-evaluated in the
context of an escalated, violent drug war in which these processes result in a reconfiguring of
local society and the foregrounding of stark economic inequalities and cultural disjunctures.
Until recently, the focus on Mexico’s struggle with drug cartels largely centered on the
U.S.-Mexico border region, where the narcoeconomy is pervasive and violent (cf. Campbell,
2005, 2008, 2009; Payan, 2006; Willoughby, 2003). The U.S. has tried to control the “spillover”
of drug trafficking though various means, including heightened border militarization and
surveillance (Heyman, 1999; Dunn, 1996). There is also a history of high-profile violence
involving public officials that has punctuated the more routinized violence between cartels vying
for turf and market share. In 1993-1994, a Catholic Bishop was gunned down in Guadalajara; a
presidential candidate was assassinated in Tijuana; and the Secretary General of the then-ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was shot to death in Mexico City. 1 The suspicion was
that these killings were drug-cartel related, though definitive proof has never been uncovered.
Nevertheless, the pattern led Andrew Reding (1995) to perceptively warn of an emergent narcopolitics in Mexico. Other scholars were beginning to argue that Mexico should be labeled a
“narco-state” or “narco-democracy” (e.g., Pasternostro, 1995; Andreas, 1998; Massing, 2000).
Most recently, George Grayson (2009a) has strongly suggested that Mexico is on the verge of
becoming a failed state. If such labeling was at one time seen as perhaps over dramatized, recent
events highlight that the interpenetration of cartels with state politics is deep and pervasive.
At this time, Mexico is the major supplier of cocaine and marijuana for the U.S., where
demand seems bottomless. [In 2006 somewhere between 530 and 710 metric tons of cocaine
entered the U.S.—an estimated 90% of which came from Mexico (Office of National Drug
Control Policy, 2007). It is further estimated that Mexico produced 13,500 metric tons of
marijuana in 2003 and accounts for the vast majority of that drug that enters into the U.S. (United
States Department of Justice, 2005). Mexico is also an important supplier of heroin and
methamphetamine. The production and distribution of illegal drugs is controlled by seven major
cartels: Juarez, Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia. If there was
ever any question about the relationship between the cartels and governance in Mexico, the
question was answered by events that unfolded in late spring 2009.
On 26 May 2009, the Mexican federal government undertook its boldest move in the ongoing war being waged with the country’s drug cartels. Security forces swept into the WestCentral state of Michoacán and arrested 10 mayors and 20 other high ranking state officials
including the State Attorney General (Wilkinson, 2009; La Voz de Michoacán, 2009).
Interestingly, Governor Leonel Godoy was not informed of the operation until it was underway.
His brother, Julio Cesar Godoy, was questioned and later sought in connection with providing
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protection for the local cartel. Wilkinson (2009) further reports that, “[a]t least 83 of
Michoacán’s 113 municipalities are mixed up on some level with the narcos.” Most recently, the
state’s Deputy Director of Public Safety was gunned down in Morelia—he had been on the job a
scant two weeks (Montero, 2009).
Mexico’s Attorney General, Eduardo Medina Mora, contends that the cartel in control of
Michoacán, known as La Familia2 (The Family), is the country’s most ruthless and violent gang
(de la Luz González, Gómez & Torres, 2009; Grayson, 2009b). They announced their presence
when 20 gunmen stormed a crowded dance hall and dumped five severed heads on a club’s dance
floor in the city of Uruapan in September 2006. Since then, they have moved quickly to
marginalize the Sinaloa and the Beltran-Leyva cartels. Subsequent to their auspicious
introduction, they have amassed the largest number of arms among the cartels, estimated at well
over 10,000 weapons, 60% of which are large (e.g., machine guns, rocket launchers, etc.), and
they have conducted the highest number of executions of any cartel in Mexico, along with the
carrying out of the more mundane activities associated with cartels, such as kidnappings,
detentions, extortion, and robbery (de la Luz González, Gómez & Torres, 2009). Former
Presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the left-leaning Democratic
Revolutionary Party (PRD) underscored the gravity of the death toll by saying that the number of
drug cartel related deaths was higher than during any revolution (Jiménez, 2009). Though he
was trying to chastise President Felipe Calderón’s (National Action Party or PAN) strong
military aggression against the cartels, he hit upon an emergent truth—Mexico’s drug war is
taking on the profile of a civil war whereby cartels have enlisted the nation’s poor and marginal
as their foot soldiers; the cartels are creating a social base; they have used their economic power
to infiltrate all levels of politics; and they have unleashed waves of violence unseen in
contemporary times. Since January 2007, almost 10,000 people3 have been killed and 45,000
military troops have been deployed, along with 5,000 federal police in 18 states—even President
Calderón was forced to admit, “[t]his is a war” (Los Angeles Times, 2009).
The U.S.-Mexico border used to be the focus of what most Americans considered to be
Mexico’s drug war. Violence used to be synonymous with Juarez, Tijuana, or Reynosa. The
interior was largely quiet. Now it is only too clear that places like Michoacán are really more at
the drug war’s epicenter. Indeed, Michoacán was the first state to be militarized by President
Calderón in 2007, drawing clear attention to the dire problems there.
In the wake of the unprecedented arrests of public officials in Michoacán, a wave of
extreme violence shook that state. La Familia reacted with swift vengeance over the loss of its
operatives in the political system, along with the arrest of one of its Chiefs of Operations,
Arnoldo Rueda Medina. Twelve military intelligence officials were kidnapped, tortured, and
killed in what was the single deadliest attack on Mexican security officers; in all 16 officers were
killed in a four-day period that saw a coordinated attack on security forces in eight Michoacán
communities and two others in Guerrero and Guanajuato (de la Luz González, 2009; Gómez
Leyva, 2009). Attacks against police stations, military barracks, and hotels occurred elsewhere in
Michoacán and other states, leading to the deaths of two more soldiers and six federal police
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(Castillo, 2009). Even Bishops within the Catholic Church have been threatened by La Familia
to enforce the clergy’s silence on the criticism of drug trafficking (Rodríguez, 2009). It is
estimated that among Mexico’s 15,000 priests, 1,000 have received threats from cartels, and
particularly outspoken clergy have been murdered (Castillo, 2009). In what has to be the most
surreal dimension of the latest surge of conflict and violence between the cartels and government,
the purported head of La Familia, Servando Gómez Martínez (otherwise known as “La Tuta”)
sent a communication to President Calderón requesting that they wage a “clean war.” By that he
meant to invite the president to conduct a war in which collateral damage to family members
(e.g., wives, children, etc.) be kept to a minimum (cf. Lacey, 2009a). To demonstrate the
professional nature of his operation, La Tuta closed his message with, “[w]e are not kidnappers,
nor do we kill for money” (El Universal, 2009a).
Given that Michoacán is one of the central locales in the Mexican drug war, it is
important to ask how the narcoeconomy affects rural communities with long histories of
otherwise mundane economic activity. I will begin with a general description of one such place,
a small town to which I apply the pseudonym “Buenavista.” This initial orienting section will be
followed by a series of ethnographic examples of the manner in which the narcoeconomy has
been woven into the local social fabric, both materially and conceptually. The community is, in
fact, in many ways very ordinary. Many residents are dedicated to dairy farming or dairy
processing, activities through which few, if any, get rich. Most are lucky to just get by. Yet,
immersion in the place reveals odd anomalies: large, expensive houses; cybercafés; urbanoriented clothing stores; high-stakes cockfighting; a day spa; and a new cadre of entrepreneurial
narco-farmers who purchase lavish ranches. This newly emergent consumer culture simply does
not describe the poor, agrarian roots of the place or the day-to-day experiences of most of its
inhabitants. The stark contrast between poverty and opulence begs for further analysis of a
rapidly changing cultural dynamic and how this shapes the lives and imaginations of the majority
population of hard working, often impoverished, residents.
The Place
Buenavista is a small town of about 10,000 people nestled in a valley between mountains
that constitute part of the neo-volcanic axis that cuts across the center of Mexico. It is a
community with a long agrarian history and a regionally important dairy industry. Indeed, my
research there explored problems of globalization and agricultural development. This essay
emerged out of long-term research projects that specifically focused on the political economy of
dairying in Buenavista and adjacent regions (e.g., McDonald, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2005, 2006). During the course of my research, the area’s narcoeconomy, however,
formed a persistent backdrop and a tangential, yet sustained, narrative theme among the many
farmers, dairy processors, and government officials that I have interviewed and worked with
since the mid 1990s. The topic came into sharper focus in the 2002 field season as part of ongoing research exploring the social and cultural dynamics of organizational initiatives by area
farmers. This essay is based upon interviews and observational data that accumulated over the
past decade.

The Cultural Effects of the Narcoeconomy in Rural Mexico
5

A Profile of Buenavista
Buenavista is hardly at the end of the road in the mountains or down a lonely jungle path
in the lowlands. It is a rural community that once had a thriving ranching economy and is well
connected to the rest of the world. The town’s older residents still embrace the values of a
traditional ranchero (rancher) culture (cf. Baisneé, 1989; Barragán López, 1989, 1997; Cochet,
1991; Barragán López et al., 1994; Léonard, 1995). For rancheros, wealth was measured by the
quantity of land they owned and the number of cattle they held, scrawny or otherwise. Men
prided themselves on their horsemanship, gallantry, and thrift. They were aggressively
independent and self-sufficient (Quinones, 2001) and highly adaptive to new and changing
economic circumstances (Barragán López, 1997). The main use for money was to buy land or
cattle. Since the 1880s, life revolved around the dairy economy and a Spartan lifestyle. It was
only from about 1940 onward that people invested in anything that might be construed as a
luxury. As Lomnitz-Adler (1993) aptly points out, rancheros create a culture of individual
dominance packaged in populist rhetoric. They are self-made and have conquered their once
isolated, inhospitable, and marginal region. Their narrative of migration and conquest also primes
them for, what is for many, their latest role as poor migrants in search of economic opportunities
in the U.S. (cf. Farr, 2006). Overall, the ranchero narrative, of course, erases others, be they
indigenous peoples, ejidatarios, or peasants. Lomnitz-Adler (1993) underscores two dimensions
of difference that are used to distinguish rancheros: (1) class or wealth and (2) race. Rancheros,
as a category, are wealthier and they are whiter than those surrounding them. Together, this
combination of class position and racial identity creates a powerful regional cultural hegemony.
Like many other towns in the region, Buenavista is characterized by brick and block
houses that are interspersed with old adobe structures—reminders of a bygone era. On the
surface, the main economic anchor for the region is dairy farming and the complementary activity
of processing milk into dense white cheese, yogurt, and a variety of milk-based candies. Over
80% of the farmers are small in scale, milking fewer than 20 cows in their daily milking routine.
Production methods are often traditional. Farmers milk in the fields by hand, have limited access
to water, and use few medicines. Their milk cows are poor in quality and have low productivity,
in part because of endemic diseases such as mastitis, but also due to lack of water and poor
quality diets. All of this activity occurs against a backdrop of increasingly deforested mountains
and valleys that suffer from severe overgrazing, the associated environmental consequences of
which further threaten farmer livelihood. Dairy processing, in what are locally known as
“creameries,” complements the farming activity in Buenavista. Of the 60 dairy processors in this
town, most are small and family-run. A few medium-sized operations process over 10,000 liters
of milk daily, and only one large-scale operation processes over 27,000 liters daily.
Thus, it would be incorrect to think of Buenavista as a town wholly defined by the
narcoeconomy (cf. Fineman, 1996). Indeed, I have visited one such place elsewhere in Central
Mexico, a town off the beaten path that I stumbled onto as I drove over dirt roads on what was

Journal of International and Global Studies
6
supposed to be a short cut. Suddenly, I came upon a town, by all appearances, with a cluster of
buildings forming a central plaza of store fronts and offices. A couple of high-end late model
trucks were parked in the shade Yet it was empty of people, except for the occasional furtive
glance by someone through a doorway. At one end of the plaza was a massive compound.
Peaking above its high walls was a richly tiled, pagoda-style roof—a complete anomaly,
especially in that part of rural Mexico. Seeing no one from whom to ask directions, I rang the
bell at the house compound, which was quickly answered by two burly men in dark glasses who
told me no one was there and, effectively, to hit the road. On my way back to my truck, I was met
by a man in a dusty suit who identified himself as a manager of a large, nearby ranch. He pointed
me in the direction of the highway. He bid me farewell and made sure I left.
Buenavista, in contrast, appears to be rather commonplace. It is its ordinariness that
forms a powerful front. On a day-to-day basis, people go about their business. That business is
usually related to dairying, either as a farmer, dairy processor, hired hand, veterinarian, cattlefeed seller, or extension agent. The town also has a bank, a church, a few small restaurants,
several dentists and doctors, and a number of stores and small food markets. It is institutionally
complete. The town’s rhythm follows those of the dairy cows—up early to milk, a midday break,
and afternoon milking again. After 6:00 p.m. and a shower, farmers and their families flow into
the town’s plaza where they socialize and pass what is left of day.
A View Down the Valley
My own second-floor lodging in a small pensión (boarding house)—built with migrant
money by a man who had spent years in California—looked down the main valley and provided a
lofty vantage point to survey the town. The accommodations were, like the town, squeaky clean
with no frills. I had stayed at this place many times. It was from this vantage point that I was
able to observe physical changes in the town over time and from which the inequalities that
characterize Buenavista initially became evident. Significant new construction—mostly
residences and warehouses—increasingly emerged on the landscape. Closer scrutiny revealed
that many of those warehouses were extremely large, and the houses were often lavish.
Numerous trips down the valley into the communities of the more humid and productive
lowlands found no similar analogs. An interview with a PANista federal congressman was
instructive in this regard. He was in the midst remodeling his own home. He noted that he made
a very good salary and was investing everything he could into his renovation project. He invited
me to compare his house and what he was doing with many of the construction projects around
town, about which he then said:
We all know what construction costs these days; it’s sky high. I will tell you and you can
repeat this, much of what you see around town is narco-money. And I don’t just tell you
this out of suspicion.
Poverty, Wealth, and the Narcoeconomy
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The modified and new cultural forms and practices found in Buenavista were emerging in
a place where local farmers were losing their struggle for a decent livelihood in a rapidly
globalizing economy. Indeed, I have rarely met a wealthy farmer in this region, and many were
grindingly poor. The rhetoric of neoliberal reform and trickle-down prosperity aside, times are
not likely to get any better. Recent reports out of Buenavista suggest that efforts begun in the
early to mid 2000s aimed at organizing farmers to produce higher quality milk for a just market
price have failed for a variety of reasons. Extension agents working with those organizational
projects, furthermore, were not paid for over three years by the state’s agricultural ministry. Not
surprisingly, then, this region, and Michoacán in general, fuel Mexico’s migrant pipeline to the
U.S. Rural people are being rendered obsolete and are displaced in a faltering agrarian economy.
This has resulted in widespread migration, unemployment, and underemployment among those
left behind. Those who left for the U.S. did so to obtain what I refer to as “dollar power.” That
is, they earned highly valued U.S. dollars and pumped them back into the local economy. (The
value of the Mexican peso, by contrast, has eroded markedly over the past 30 years.) Those U.S.
dollars were earned through jobs that paid far higher wages than those that migrants could find at
home. Migrant remittances, thus, brought massive sums of money back into the state and helped
keep the rural economy afloat.4 However, with the global economic downturn in 2008-2009, the
Mexican economy has been battered on two fronts. First, Mexican GDP shrank 10% in the
second quarter of 2009. Second, migrant remittances have also plummeted—down virtually 18%
in the second quarter of 2009 from the previous year, and off 12% during the first six months of
2009 (Ellingwood, 2009). Overall, broad-based rural decline and poverty continues to create
fertile conditions for the narcoeconomy to flourish.5 This, in turn, creates further forms of
cultural and economic displacement.
Even early on in my research, what caught my attention was the dramatic inequality in
Buenavista, most easily seen in large, ostentatious houses, massive warehouses, and fancy
apartment buildings that contrasted with modest brick and block affairs or dilapidated adobe
structures. Inequality was further foregrounded in leisure activities, such as cockfights, where a
wealthy few participated, and bets were often in the thousands of dollars. Several different
things drove inequality: successful local entrepreneurship, migrant money, and drug trafficking.
A number of community members, knowing very well the cost of new construction, argued that
the most marked inequalities were underwritten by narco-money. Others commented on the
ostentatious bets being made at the local cockfights. Still others noted how the agricultural land
prices had inflated over the last ten years. They too concluded that an infusion of narco-money
was at the root of these inequalities. Drug money is now routinized in daily discourse and
materialized in architecture, cars, clothes, champion cattle, and leisure activities. As Andreas
(1998) poignantly observes, the narcoeconomy provides poor people with a kind of economic
exit option.
The narcoeconomy is also far more than drug production; it has a huge multiplier effect in
the vast array of other jobs it generates both directly (e.g., transportation, security, banking, and
communication) and indirectly (e.g., construction, the service sector, and spin-off businesses). It
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is this everyday integration that I would like to explore in considering how rural communities
and culture are being reshaped in subtle and not so subtle ways. In part, this integration is
experienced directly through various material manifestations. It is also experienced through a
dimension that is indirect and imagined (Long, 1995). Both are powerful forms of displacement
and disjuncture that are transforming what it is to imagine and to be a rural community member.
In Bourdieu’s (1984) terms, new forms of cultural, social, and economic capital are forming a
complex triad that is altering the local dynamic. Modernity is being reconstituted, as is the way
people pursue their economic livelihood. Here I use the concept of “modernity” advisedly and
with no small amount of ambivalence. I do not wish to imply that the region is characterized by
some sort of traditional-modern divide, as implied by Robert Redfield’s classic folk-urban
continuum. Despite numerous critiques, Redfield’s concept of the ‘traditional’ town lingers on
in the anthropological and popular imagination. Buenavista, however, has never been stuck in
time. Indeed, it has always been modern, albeit in a rural, ranchero way. The history of the
place underscores the dynamism of its multiple modernities. Early on, there were economic
innovations: bees wax and honey production, sheep and wool production, dairying, poultry, etc.
Later came the radio, then the highway, followed by large-scale migration, and now the narcos,
who usher in new forms of consumption and ways of conceptualizing being rural. What flows
into Buenvista now is, in part, a Western urban variant of modernity. The area, then, is best
characterized as having multiple, competing modernities that may or may not be reconciled and
institutionalized into a new form.
At this stage, it is unclear what the overall effect of the new elite’s cultural colonization
of this small community will be. In a modernist vein, Mintz (1985) argues that elite practices of
consumption may, under the right economic conditions, become broadly infused into everyday
culture through processes of “extensification” and “intensification.” Extensification, according
to Mintz, occurs when once scarce and expensive commodities become cheap enough that they
extend to regular usage by common people. In the process, the commodity’s meaning is recast
within its new, everyday context and slowly loses its historic connection to elite practices and
attenuated set of meanings. Intensification, in contrast, projects older elite meaning and practice
forward, more deeply into society among people who then reproduce formerly elite activities.
Mintz, however, notes that while old meanings and actions may get carried forward, they also
lose some of their earlier significance.
Following a somewhat similar modernist approach, de Certeau (1984) notes that elites
may overlay and impose foreign elements onto new locales and peoples. This creates a kind of
slippage in consumer culture in which elites and average citizens differently enter into acts and
rituals of consumption. De Certeau sees this as creating a possibility for forms of resistance
among the average citizenry—“[average citizens] escape the colonizing effects without leaving
it” (1984, xiii). Of course, the other side of the de Certeau argument is that the average citizen is
constantly reminded of what he or she lacks. The result may be a profound sense of relative
deprivation wherein the vast majority is relegated to the consumption sidelines as bystanders in
an institutionalized form of cultural exclusion.
Taking a more postmodern perspective, Wilk (1999, 2007; also see Colloredo-Mansfeld,
1999) invites us to question and critique the binary arguments concerning consumption (e.g.,
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emulation/resistance) that characterize the modernist approach. He offers a nuanced,
postmodern-oriented perspective and argues that we conceptualize consumption as a creolized or
hybrid experience that will carry quite different meaning for individuals depending on their
position within a consumer culture. Whiteford (2002) picks up on this theme in his analysis of
war-torn Colombia, where people are confronted with rapid, often chaotic, socio-cultural change.
They manage to find a variety of ways to “normalize the aberrant” (Whiteford, 2002, p. 108). In
Colombia, as in the Mexican case, local people learned how to appropriately read and operate
within the new social reality: “Thus, everything from the chemistry of social comportment to
understanding who has money and where power resides has been altered” (Whiteford 2002, p.
109). Accordingly, the cultural adjustment process that is underway among the average citizens
of Buenavista will likely result in the adoption of some of the new commodities and activities
flowing into town. A hybrid consumer culture will likely emerge, coupled with an acceptance,
on some level, of the abnormal.
Scenes from Buenavista
Opulent Homes and Security Systems
In the summer of 2002, Buenavista was experiencing a construction bonanza. This was
curious given the region’s failing dairy economy. Construction materials and labor were
expensive; the latter largely because so many construction workers had left for the U.S. and
better wages. An average multi-story, middle-class house might cost upward of $85,000 to
$100,000 USD. Some of the larger houses in town easily would have cost $300,000 or more;
massive sums of money by rural Mexican standards. Recall as well that unlike the U.S., there are
no loans available to finance construction costs. Construction is strictly a cash business, which
explains why Mexicans often build in stages with projects going on for years, with portions often
left unfinished.6
The fresh construction included all manner of residential housing, from small, humble
dwellings to massive houses and apartment buildings. The larger structures attracted the eye
because of their scale and bright, contrasting colors—orange, yellow, green, and blue. They were
meant to be seen. One of the more stunning of these structures was a walled compound with
gates and doors inlaid with copper, expensive wood, and glass, giving it a jewel-encrusted look.
It provided anyone on the street with a tantalizing hint of what must lay behind its walls. All that
could be seen, however, were treetops and a large, stained-glass dome in vibrant reds and greens.
On closer inspection, surveillance cameras hovered over all entryways into this villa-like affair.
As we drove by, an extension agent with whom I have been working noted the “narco-house”
and laughed.7 It was beyond further comment, which was telling. On the one hand, this
seductive materialization of place and power left so much to the imagination. On the other, it
was the manifestation of an alien social world with which most local people had little direct
engagement and over which they had no control. If my companion did not like this new social
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form in the neighborhood, there was not much he could do about it. In this way, the
narcoeconomy is a colonizing phenomenon (Appadurai 1996).
Such ostentatious, conspicuous consumption also wove its way into leisure activities that
were once the domain of the town’s average citizenry. One of the most visible of these arenas
was the local cockfight, staged on a regular basis on the outskirts of Buenavista.
Cockfights and the High-Stakes Status Game
Cockfighting has a long history in Mexico as a legal leisure activity. Although not Bali,
Mexican cockfighting exudes many of the same gender and power implications as its Southeast
Asian counterpart (cf. Geertz, 1972). The aesthetics of the event should not to be
underestimated—trainers have a stunningly intimate relationship with their birds, going so far as
to suck their heads to clear their eyes to prepare them for battle, and then again when they are
fouled with blood during the match. The intimate relationship between man and bird is built on
years of breeding and developing prized fighters—trainers take great pride in their birds beyond
anything that can be bought and sold. At stake is the trainer’s reputation and that of his
community. This contrasts with the relationship of bettors to the fight. In terms of personal status
accrued from the act of betting, it is an entirely different game. It is high macho theater in a
pleasurable context that allows the bettor to publicly display and commodify his status.
An arena that was once accessible to a much wider array of local players is now restricted
to an elite few. As we shall see, the betting structure is such that most rural peoples attending are
relegated to the status of observing those few who actually participate. Large bets not only
exclude the poor, but also the rural middle class, from entering the game.
Cockfights were advertised well in advance and always drew large crowds. As we
entered down a muddy road to the arena, parking seemed to be spatially organized, to some
degree, by social class. Just outside the arena was a small fleet of late-model Chevy Suburbans
and even a Cadillac Esplanade. Farther down the slick, red clay road, one found an array of
vehicles, mostly pickup trucks ranging from 1960s era models to more contemporary ones, all
well used. The arena itself was spare in style. It was an unpainted red brick building with a
metal roof that seemed to sprout out of the hilly landscape. Inside, a packed dirt ring was
surrounded by about 10-15 rows of tiered, blue-plastic seats, a small version of a Greek odeum.
Around the upper perimeter of the arena was a wide walkway with a bar and take-away food
stands in two of the corners. The clientele was largely composed of people from the surrounding
rancherias (small ranching villages) whose birds were competing in the night’s events, which
would run from 7:00 p.m. to about 2:00 a.m. For a small cover charge we entered to a place
abuzz mostly with onlookers. It was only the first two rows of seats that held the serious bettors
and their retinues.
A single bet was quite high: $100 USD to lose and $80 USD to win on a favored bird,
with the reverse holding true ($100 USD to win and $80 USD to lose) for a bet on a less-favored
animal. Bettors obtained fichas, a slip of colored paper signifying a single wager, from the odds
makers who worked the ring. The color of the ficha indicated whether the bet was placed on the
favored bird or its less-favored challenger. If a bettor won, the odds maker from whom he
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obtained his fichas paid up, with the reverse happening if the bettor lost. Simply put, if a bettor
placed one bet (one ficha) on a favored bird and had the good luck of that bird winning, the
bettor would collect $80 USD from the odds maker; if the bird had the poor fortune of losing, the
bettor would have to pay the odds maker $100 USD. Unlike the Balinese cockfight, it did not
appear that bettors were making complex hedging calculations by placing bets on both birds (cf.
Geertz, 1972). Rather, large wagers were placed on single birds (bettors might obtain upward of
20-25 fichas or more), with impressive sums of money changing hands.
A couple of rows in front of my seat, a young twenty-something fellow from a nearby
ranch consumed copious amounts of Courvoisier and Coke. He was sharply dressed in what
might best be described as “ranch modern” style—khaki pants, a colorful rayon shirt, and a
baseball cap (in his case, one with a Miami Dolphins logo). The odds makers paid close
attention to him and it quickly became clear why, as he peeled off numerous $500 peso notes
(then roughly equivalent to $50 USD), along with $100 USD dollar bills, to pay off a bet he had
just lost. Later in the evening, he enjoyed a winning streak and at one point won $27,000 USD
on a single match. He always bet against the favorite.
This was the ostentatious betting of which I had heard rumors in Buenavista. A farmer
who accompanied me leaned over, shrugged, and commented, “[i]t’s the marijuana or perhaps
the powder,” in order to explain the young man’s source of money.8 A long-standing pastime
was being remade into a status arena for the newly rich.
Here a return to Balinese cockfighting is useful. Part of Geertz’s analysis of the Balinese
cockfight—a fascinating critique of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of “deep play”—becomes
especially relevant. Bentham (1882) argued that high-risk, high-stakes economic transactions
(e.g., gambling) were irrational and immoral insofar as they often did not benefit the participating
parties. Geertz astutely contends that the key to understanding the rationality of big-money
betting is in its sign value in a status game. This occurs most incisively when the transaction
centers on people of similar status and, additionally, those who have high status (Geertz, 1972).
When those conditions are met, solidarity and status among the players will be legitimized and
confirmed. He notes the transformative, almost magical quality of the cockfight when he says,
“What makes the Balinese cockfighting deep is thus not money itself, but what, the more of it
that is involved the more so, money causes to happen: the migration of the Balinese status
hierarchy into the body of the cockfight” (Geertz 1972, p. 17). Status hierarchy is, thus,
materialized through the spectacle of economic play.
New Forms of Everyday Consumption for the Elite
Buenavista also had more everyday forms of consumption, though they too were stages
upon which the town’s new elite constructed status and identity. A number of novel stores had
opened, especially for higher-end, urban-style clothing that contrasted markedly with the items
available in the more traditional, and less expensive, stores in town. Indeed, these new stores
were so numerous that some even specialized in such low-volume niches as children’s wear or
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slinky lingerie. A new mall was about to open, and there was a cybercafé with surprisingly fast
internet service, as well as a day spa. These had all bubbled up within the last two or three years,
and all were located within a couple of blocks of the town’s main plaza. These new stores catered
to the town’s elite. The majority of townspeople may go by these stores and gaze into their
windows, but they do their shopping in the more traditional stores. Here we have yet other forms
of conspicuous consumption, but also a new source of ideas and ways to actively construct
identity for elites and ways to imagine identity for the average citizen.
Trading on Bourdieu’s (1984) notions of capital, Richard Wilk (1999; also see Wilk
2007, Chapter 7) has explored similar themes through the lens of food, taste, and class in Belize.
The knowledge of things foreign is, he argues, a form of cultural capital. Wilk (1999) contends
that the diffuseness of “things foreign” may render it a less crisp distinguisher of upper and lower
class in Belizean context. For Buenavista, in contrast, access to economic capital still clearly
demarcates who has access to new and exotic consumer items from the outside. Things are
clearly more fluid in Belize, where strict hierarchies of taste have eroded and are more blended.
In Buenavista, the process of change is far more incipient and hierarchies more obviously
differentiated. Thus, if we walk down the streets away from the main town plaza, there are stores
that sell an urban style that contrasts markedly with the garden-variety consumables and sites of
consumption that are part of the average citizen’s everyday life. In Buenavista, these new stores
were innovations rather than the objects of banal urban consumer drudgery. All of them flowed
into a common symbolic crucible of Western, urban-oriented style. While it was not possible to
determine that narco-money had either bankrolled these new enterprises or fueled consumption
in them, the average dairy farmer was clearly not their clientele. These businesses survived on
disposable income that was in short supply among most of the farming class. They may have
sold very little of their merchandise to the majority of townspeople. Still, by their very presence,
they altered what it was to be part of rural ranchero society. As Wilk (1999) has underscored in
the Belize example, they suggested a new openness to the outside world of ideas and practices
that will eventually infiltrate Buenavista and become an unconscious part of local culture and
practice.
The Narco-Farmer Entrepreneur
The final dimension of the narcoeconomy’s penetration into everyday life that I will
explore is through the repatriation of a particular subset of migrants back into Buenavista society.
These are the young, male migrants who have worked in U.S. drug trafficking networks.
Typically these men work through their late twenties or early thirties in the U.S. and then return
to the community, invest in a ranch, and take on the farming life. Extension agent colleagues
remarked many times, “They say that X is a narco, but he’s one of the hardest working farmers in
the area. He’s really serious.”
It is interesting that many of these returnees chose to invest in farming since it was both
hard work and not terribly lucrative. They could easily have opted for a line of work that required
less toil and sweat, such as opening some sort of business venture. Farming, however, was a sign
of legitimacy and a traditional means for attaining social status, and these young men took on the
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material trappings and practices of a respectable life that reflected local norms and values.
Baseball caps were shelved and replaced with new tejanos (cowboy hats). Whiteford (2002:109)
suggests that this is an “attempt to buy respectability.” However, it also speaks to the powerful
symbolic value of farming.
Most of these young men came from farming families and had some basic knowledge that
helped them get started. Unlike their fathers and grandfathers, however, they did not have to
start at the bottom and work their way up. Because they had cash resources, it was not
uncommon for them to pay inflated prices for ranches, artificially driving up local land values. It
was becoming harder for other farmers to afford to buy land, while at the same time making it
lucrative for those who owned choice pieces of land to sell out.
These new farmer entrepreneurs, furthermore, have been socialized in a patronage-based
political culture. This politicized culture was typical of the region in general and the
narcoeconomy specifically. Often, the new farmers found ways to tap into the resources of the
state, through their network of caciques (political bosses), in order to subsidize or otherwise draw
resources to their ranches. Because of the local narco-political networks, they frequently had
success in gaining access to development resources. As with most money laundering schemes,
those launching them need to be successful and make a profit.9 Though it was impossible to
confirm, my impression was that these individuals not only sought legitimacy, but had also
invested everything they were able into their new enterprises without much left in reserve. Thus,
the stakes were high, and they had to make their new farming operations successful. This made
them very interesting players on the local agricultural development scene—committed members
of the farming community struggling against a dying way of life. In sum, economic capital is
important, but, following Bourdieu (1984), the cultural and social capital associated with new
farmers is equally so. These new farmers control the symbolic objects of status (land and cattle)
and the social networks that help them politically. Nonetheless, the control of these powerful
forms of capital does not provide them with ultimate legitimacy or respect.
Specifically, because of their connection to local narco-political networks, some
townspeople were suspicious of the new farmers’ motives for participating in local development
efforts. The question the townspeople raised was whether these new farmers were operating on
their own behalf or on that of their narco-patron. Consequently, the new farmers’ position was
always ambiguous and a bit suspect. As one farmer noted in reference to a local development
initiative, “[Fulano] was participating in the project, but he dropped out to go back with [his
patron].” In this case, his patron was promoting a competing project. Everyone seemed very
clear on how these individuals came by their money, yet they participated relatively seamlessly in
the local dairy economy. This was a sign of the routinization of this pathway to land and other
resources. (Notably, because they have spent considerable time in the U.S. where they were
exposed to new ideas and had honed their business skills, these new farmers were often inclined
to be early adopters of innovations. The extension agents I have worked with always found them
open and willing to seriously consider new ideas, practices, and technologies.)
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Discussion
New Forms of Cultural and Social Capital
Bejeweled houses, new types of consumer culture, rich young farmers, and wild
extravagance infused into leisure activities all led to new forms of desire and imagined ways of
being that can be highly seductive (or highly repellant depending on one’s perspective).
Buenavista had become a resonating chamber for the reverberations of the different cultural and
material forms that were reconstituting local culture and practice. While many of the new forms
of consumption may have appeared out of place, only the most ostentatious of them received
comment. These new forms of consumption were being rapidly routinized. Ironically, most
members of the community were unable to actually participate. They simply could not afford to
do so. In this way, new forms of modernity were being institutionalized, as were the inequalities
they established and signified. They, further, made the narco-life appear to be a potentially
desirable strategy for economic success. Grillo (2009), for example, reports that La Familia will
pay their employees a basic starting salary of $2,000 USD per month—10 times the minimum
wage.
Buenavista is a town of stark contrasts—poverty pitted against the conspicuous
consumption of the newly rich. It would be tempting to see this extravagant consumption as a
form of hyperconsumption, as conceptualized by Jean Baudrillard (1989, 1995) or George Ritzer
(2009). It is enticing because day spas seem to bizarrely out of place and fantastic in a workingclass farming town on Mexico’s margins. Regardless of how odd these may seem, we are still
dealing with real brick and mortar structures and not the often virtual simulation and spectacle of
Las Vegas or Disneyland.
We have seen, however, that the denizens of Buenavista are confronted with markedly
new forms of cultural and social capital that are subverting old forms of status and power, and to
which the average citizen has no access. Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of cultural capital rests on
knowledge—the learning of those signs and activities that signify taste, success, and power. We
have seen a number of these in the various ethnographic scenes presented above. The new
narco-farmer buys his way into the existing status and prestige system of the community by
purchasing a premier ranch and stocking it with top-quality cows.10 He does not achieve this
through years of experience, but rather through his new dollar power. In so doing, he inflates the
local land and cattle markets, making it even harder for any legitimate farmer to aspire to afford
such a luxurious ranch, thereby subverting the existing system.
The narco-farmer is also well situated in social networks that ensure access to state
resources. Those networks act as a form of social capital. This is a classic form of differential
privilege found in Michoacán, whereby patronage systems are mobilized to gain political access
in ways that are not possible for average citizens.
The cockfight is a particularly interesting example of both cultural and social capital
intertwined in a single event. Again, we see narcos coming to dominate a traditional system of
status and leisure. They know where and how to insert themselves to gain and legitimize their
status. By virtue of their economic power, making bets so large that the average citizen cannot
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participate, they become the observed by a crowd that cannot hope to participate. In the process,
they develop the recognition of status legitimacy by onlookers and also develop social capital by
creating networks of solidarity with other narco-gamblers. As Geertz (1972, p. 22) observes,
“[t]he more the match is (1) between near status equals [and] (2) between high status individuals,
the deeper the match….the greater the emotion that will be involved and the more general
absorption in the match.” In sum, focus is shifted from an economic game to a far more
symbolic and status-oriented one.
Finally, the new urban-oriented consumption patterns, the cybercafé, and the day spa all
point to the importation of the foreign into the local. To access these, one must know what they
are and value them, as well as have sufficient buying power. They too are forms of cultural
capital that most Buenavisteños do not understand very well, let alone have much interest in.
While these new forms of social and cultural capital may prove to have their seductions
for the average citizen, the likelihood that these citizens will ever have or experience them is
remote, especially given the current state of the Mexican economy. At least for the foreseeable
future, there is little chance that there will be a blending of the new dominant form of status and
power into the old one.
As such, there is strong potential for a willing and able reserve labor pool, mostly of
young men, who will be eager to gain access to these new forms of capital. This will be
especially true as farms continue to fail, jobs dry up at an even faster pace, and older forms of
prowess become less valued (e.g., horsemanship, gallantry, thrift).
The Development Vacuum in a World of Escalating Violence
Young men form the primary labor pool for the area’s narcoeconomy, and they have few
viable economic options. First, they can be farmers with little or no land who can only reconcile
to a life that will result in poverty. Second, they can migrate, most likely to the U.S., in search of
jobs and higher wages. Third, they can get involved with the local narcoeconomy, sometimes in
conjunction with being a migrant. The final option will have an increasingly strong attraction for
young men living on the poor margins as the rural economy continues to collapse and the U.S.
economy continues to falter, further constricting the job market for U.S.-bound migrants. Women
in this area typically remain behind to maintain homes, care for families, and work at whatever
poorly paid job they can find.11
In a development vacuum, the narcoeconomy has certainly infused an otherwise
moribund rural economy with cash and jobs. In part, then, from a neoliberal perspective it might
be argued that some of the effects seen from the narcoeconomy in Buenavista are positive. The
narcoeconomy ushered in certain forms of consumption into an otherwise stagnant, marginal
community; it brought money back into the community in various forms of legal reinvestment
activities, such as farms and businesses; and it provided many people with all manner of jobs. At
the same time, it has also exacerbated existing inequalities; created gross spectacles and rituals of
excess; underwritten the construction of ostentatious houses; inflated land values; raised levels of
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interpersonal violence and fear; and increased problems with local drug addiction. All of these
features, good or bad, are being shaped within a larger political-economic context that has been
dominated by policies and practices stemming from the opening of the Mexican economy, which
was formally institutionalized by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.
The pressures of poverty and globalization are poignantly addressed in a narco-corrido (drug
ballad)—“Michoacán Harvest”—by El Cejas y su Banda Fuego (Brown Eyes and his Fiery
Band12):
The product we offer is first quality
You can sample it if you want
Harvest in Michoacán
It’s pure goat’s tail
It’s part of the best product
We have picked from our land
In Michoacán soil
We harvest tons of it
In our green meadows we plant the “evil weed”
And it’s transformed into millions in the United States
The say the mafia dies
And this is a big lie
The product has been “internationalized” to a large scale
And our Mexican land gets more and more famous
In La Ruanda and El Aguaje
They have changed their crops
They used to plant corn
But those times are gone
Today, you can see the green tops
Of that very expensive grass
There are many who criticize us
I am going to give them some advice
If this was an easy business
Everyone would be involved in it
It is not a matter of having pants
One has to wear them well
With these lines, I say goodbye
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They are expecting me in Tijuana
As I finishing delivering this parcel
And I am back in La Ruana
To prepare another load for some friends in Atlanta
Despite this and other popular culture valorizations of drug trafficking (cf. Edberg, 2004),
many Buenavisteños were both disgusted and frightened by the blossoming of the narcoeconomy
in the late 1980s and 1990s. The level of anger and frustration, though perhaps not surprising, is
interesting when compared to other cases. In Michoacán’s tierra caliente (hot, semi-tropical
lowlands), local “insiders” distinguish themselves from narco-traffickers, who are largely
“outsiders” and who have moved into their community and altered it. Those who are local
frequently attain the label of “good narcos” who are said to exhibit greater support and concern
for the community (Malkin, 2001). In contrast, Buenavista has no such convenient scheme for
differentiation. Participants in the narcoeconomy come from families with long histories in the
region and robust kinship and friendship networks within the community. To heighten local
frustration even more, this is a highly conservative community, a former stronghold of the
Cristero movement, which pitted devout Catholics against the federal government’s anti-clerical
reforms during the mid 1920s into the early 1930s. Strong religious conviction and the
accompanying values of hard work, thrift, and moral living conflict directly with the
narcoeconomy and its associated lifestyle.
In the early to mid 2000s, there had been relatively little violence in Buenavista, unlike
the bloody drama occurring along the U.S.-Mexico border. Indeed, people could recite the
relatively few violent or threatening events that people felt were narco related. For the most part,
then, violence or its fear was part of the local imagination far more than a regular experience.
Those occasions of violence that had occurred in Buenavista were part of local lore. For
example, there was an oft-told story about the owner of high-profile business who was gunned
down in broad daylight a number of years ago by men carrying cuernos de chivo (goat’s horns),
as AK-47 automatic assault rifles are known. Everyone knows that AK-47s—illegal in
Mexico—are the weapons of choice for drug traffickers.
In Buenavista, the rare spectacle became inserted into the ongoing flow of events
sporadically punctuated with less immediately dramatic occurrences: a drug-related arrest; a
murder; or the kidnapping of a local businessman in order to extort money. Taken as a whole,
these cumulative events created a constant, low-intensity anxiety that lurked just below the
surface of daily life.
This has changed dramatically with the militarization of Michoacán in 2007. Levels of
violence throughout the state have escalated rapidly. A former lawyer from Michoacán laid out
the basic outline of events (personal communications, 1 May and 7 June 2009) La Familia was
formerly a home-grown cartel operating within Michoacán only. In 2006, they extended their
operations into the nearby states of Guerrero, Jalisco, and Mexico. The Gulf and Sinoloa Cartels,
whose turf was now challenged, pushed back violently. This set off a wave of inter-cartel
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violence that still rages. When the military made its bold move against the cartels, that aggression
was turned against the government as well. He argues that violence was formerly contained
within a small subset of politicians and cartels, which rarely involved the public at large. Today,
cartels, politicians, corrupt security forces, caciques, and paramilitaries are all involved in
complex ways. For the average citizen, this is especially frightening because the sources of
violence are so varied and unpredictable.
In Buenavista, a son from one of the town’s wealthiest and most influential families was
shot to death in Guadalajara several years ago. More recently, one of the new narco-farmers in
town was the subject of a failed assassination attempt in 2007. He was seriously injured, but
survived. In 2008, a former municipal police officer, having left her job only months previously,
was arrested as part of a regional kidnapping ring, one of whose victims was from Buenavista
(Alertaperiodista 2008). In a nearby community, gunmen killed the town’s mayor, perhaps in
retaliation for his recent firing of the police commander and an officer (CNN, 2009). What was
once a low-intensity anxiety, has now blossomed as the threat of violence takes on a new, far
more immediate reality. As Lacey (2009b) observes:
These days…those offering the biggest mordidas [bribes]…are the traffickers, who Mr.
Calderón’s administrations acknowledges have thousands of police officers, small-town
mayors, and even high-level government officials across the country on their payroll,
something now regarded as a full-fledged national crisis.
One unnamed government official noted ominously, “Anyone could be a narco” (Lacey, 2009a).
Conclusion
Consider the following scene from an 18 February 2009 video report from the border city
of Reynosa, which had erupted in a firestorm of violence that day (El Universal, 2009b). A
reporter and his cameraman are atop a bridge where they are taping Mexican troops in what
appears to be fierce street fighting. Both are crouched and suddenly gunfire escalates from all
sides. The two men dive to the ground but keep taping. Finally the gunfire subsides. The
reporting crew descends to the scene of the crime. What is left are numerous dead cartel soldiers,
similarly dressed in white shirts and khaki pants, their AK-47s and AR-15s at their sides. Troop
carriers and patrol cars speed off to the next engagement in what looks like pure chaos.
Michael Whiteford’s (2002) essay on Colombia captures the essence of a world turned
culturally upside down by an entrenched civil war in which the abnormal is normal people live in
a cloak of fear and everyday threat. It is a world of mimetic fragments in which the large and
small details of life’s scenes are constantly askew. I would argue that trends in Mexico are
following suit. The scene from Reynosa is now being repeated regularly across the country.
Thus, in the Mexican version, violence is now part of daily life with casualties on all
sides, including the innocent. The death toll mounts to nearly 10,000 since 2007 as drug
traffickers battle each other and government security forces with impunity. That the violence is
associated with all sides, including shadowy paramilitary groups, further erodes any confidence
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in the possibility for public security and civil authority. Troops are met with heavily armed cartel
members, 80% or more of whose weapons come from the U.S. (McKinley, 2009; McLemore,
2008). It is a world where in which is also a rapidly collapsing political authority structure—
congressman-elect from Michoacán, Julio Cesar Godoy (half brother to the state’s governor) is
on the run and accused of providing protection to La Familia; Saul Solis, a failed Green Party
candidate in Michoacán is also accused of aiding and abetting the same cartel. Others are
mentioned regularly as having narco ties, including gubernatorial candidate from Colima, Mario
Anguiano (banner from drug hitmen endorsing his candidacy); Michoacán Governor Leonel
Godoy (evidence that he may have received Gulf Cartel money in support of his 2007 campaign);
Mauricio Fernandez, who ran for mayor of a wealthy suburb of Monterrey (on tape saying that
town security is controlled by a cartel); Governor Fidel Herrera of Veracruz (allegations he cut a
deal with the Gulf Cartel to lower violence); a Senator from Zacatecas, Ricardo Monreal
temporarily stepped down after 14.5 tons of marijuana was found on property owned by two of
his brothers. Even former President Fox (2000-2006) has entered the fray, accusing former
Sonoran governor and current senator, Manlio Fabio Beltrones, of links to the cartels. Regardless
of the truth to these claims, the claims themselves create a resonating chamber of fear, mistrust,
and a crisis of faith in the political system.
The May 2009 arrests of 30 politicians and state functionaries in Michoacán is the de
facto admission by the federal government that the narcopolitica (narcopolitics) is, in fact,
deeply rooted in Mexico. Corruption, in sum, seems to be riddled throughout the system. “While
Mr. Calderón dismisses suggestions that Mexico is a failed state, he and his aids have spoken
frankly of the cartels’ attempts to set up a state within a state, levying taxes, throwing up
roadblocks, and enforcing their own perverse code of behavior. Across the country, the Mexican
government has identified 233 ‘zones of impunity’ in which crime is largely uncontrolled, a
figure that is down from 2,204 zones a year ago” (Lacey, 2009c). One can only hope the
government is making the progress that is claimed.
The view from Michoacán renders a grim picture. The coordinated attack on security
forces and facilities in eight communities across Michoacán and two communities in neighboring
states on 11 July 2009 sent a clear message to the nation. La Familia had conducted a highly
coordinated offensive against the government and exacted the highest single-day death toll in
Mexico’s drug war. This has led some journalists to call this “El Tet michoacano” (Michoacán’s
Tet) after the 1968 communist offensive in Vietnam (Gómez Leyva, 2009). While the
comparison is considerably overextended, the intention is clear. Mexico’s drug war is looking
increasingly like a civil war. Indeed, cartels are fighting it with furious impunity and
coordination. The invocation of the “Tet” signifier underscores, on one level, the perception that
the cartels are fighting with fearless impunity and coordination. Far more importantly, however,
it suggests that (1) an active civil war is now being acknowledged and (2) there is a profound loss
of faith in the government’s ability to stop the cartels (Llana, 2009). While President Calderón
forcefully proclaims, “We cannot, we should not, we will not take one step backward in this
matter,” a recent poll shows that only 23% of the Mexican public feel that the government is
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winning, and 56% feel that they are losing the war against the cartels and that President
Calderón’s popularity is eroding (Iliff & Corchado, 2009). A reasonable reading of these data
suggests a broad-based social exhaustion with the worsening civil war violence, and the everyday
fear and dis-ease that accompanies it. This is more than just perception. The federal government
admits that the cartels control an estimated 62% of the country’s police officers, at least a portion
of whom are grouped into 200 cartel-loyal “brotherhoods,” along with heavy penetration of
federal, state, and municipal governments (Castillo García, 2009). Together these data signal a
rapidly advancing legitimacy crisis for the government. Perversely, it would appear that cartels
have gotten the upper hand in the dystopian world they have created.
Groups such as La Familia do not just control through fear and violence. They have
established a parallel system of governance. They provide the social services and support in poor
communities that the government and the Catholic Church do not. In other words, they are
creating a popular social network of support. One supporter of La Familia summarized the
situation: “I know they [La Familia] are really crazy. In fact, I think they are really sick
sometimes, but they are the only people in town who can help you if you get in trouble, so that’s
why I joined the group” (Tuckman & Vulliamy, 2009). As Samuel González, Mexico’s former
top anti-drug prosecutor in the mid-1990s, stated prophetically: “These attacks show La Familia
has a social base. They are warning the government that if it doesn’t change its strategy, there
could be a social revolt” (Tuckman & Vulliamy, 2009). Thus, the rapidly devolving political
situation and looming legitimacy crisis finds disturbing parallels with Colombia (despite the
more ideological bent to the struggle in Colombia), or the efforts of the Taliban in Central Asia.
The view from Buenavista is equally disheartening. The cultural changes going on
there—founded on the cultural effects of the narcoeconomy—will eventually have an indelible
impact on thought and practice, though how and in what form remains unclear. It is certainly
difficult for narco-elites to convert their cultural capital into other forms of capital because of
their distant juxtaposition with poorer ranchers and farmers. However, La Familia has made
some inroads by claiming divine and Revolutionary legitimacy powerful forms of symbolic
capital. They have further used their economic power to develop a parallel government and a
social base. In Buenavista, narcos have, to some extent, pulled together cultural and social
capital in ways that have fortified their efforts. For the average citizen, confronting violence and
its threat, new forms of cultural and economic domination, and the on-going erosion of state
authority does not suggest any reconciliation of these various forms of capital in the near future,
if it at all. What of a world in which there is a normalized abnormal and where regular citizens
are relegated to the status of bystander to and consumer of the cultural spectacle of the
narcoeconomy yet are otherwise rendered silent as they embody the tragedy of Mexico?
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Indeed, Raul Salinas, brother of former President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), was charged with masterminding the
plot to kill Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the Secretary General of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. He remains in
jail.
2

La Familia appears to combine an extreme form of evangelical Christianity in combination with sloganeering
reminiscent of the 1910 Revolution and such iconic figures as Emilio Zapata and Pancho Villa (Grillo, 2009;
Grayson, 2009a, 2009b). This is not some facile devotion to “Santa Muerte” (Saint Death). This powerful
ideological framework should not be underestimated, for it trades on two simulacra that resonate deeply with
Mexicans: the divine and the Revolution (cf. McDonald, 1993). As such, it also serves to expose the class war being
waged between the cartels and the government. They were initially the local gang in an evangelical Catholic
community of Nueva Jerusalen, Michoacán (cf. Quinones, 2001, Chapter 10). They were then taken into the Beltran
Leyva organization. From that humble origin, they have moved quickly since the mid 2000s to marginalize the other
cartels that formerly controlled the state.

3

In a macabre statistic, from 1 January 2007 to 29 May 2009, Chihuahua state leads in the number of narco-related
deaths (2,502), followed by Sinaloa (1,257), Baja California (894), Guererro (779), Durango (679), Michoacán
(629), Mexico (620), Federal District (364), and Jalisco (312), Sonora (305)—in all 9,903 deaths (Los Angeles
Times 2009). It is important to recall, however, that the running tab on deaths stops just before the major upsurge of
violence in summer 2009 (see, for example, El Universal, 2009c).
4

In the early 2000s, it was estimated that as much as US$14 billion dollars flowed into the Mexican economy
through migrant remittances (Rosemberg, 2003).

5

Merton’s (1968) classic “strain theory” long ago argued that social forces cause crime. The working poor are most
vulnerable to the strain caused by the disjunction between economic aspirations and their legitimate ability to meet
them. Crime, then, flourishes in that gap.

6

The intermittent construction of homes is seen as a highly legitimate process because everyone knows that money,
especially money that comes through migrant remittances, is highly variable in amount and timing. ColloredoMansfeld (1999) notes something similar in his field site of Otovalo, Ecuador. Otavalo is a tourist town where
successful merchants and artisans slowly renovate their houses in a process that demonstrates their entrpeneurial
skills and prowess; thus legitimizing them as successful entrepreneurs.

7

Payan (2006:49-50) makes a similar observation about the lavish “narco-mansions” of Juárez.

8

His comment is reminiscent of some of James C. Scott’s observations in his classic ethnography, Weapons of the
Weak (1985). In this case, the use of rumor and innuendo could be seen a kind of resistance and a form of social
critique.

9

While it might be argued that all businesses need to be successful, if a money laundering scheme is set up solely to
provide its owner with a front of legitimacy, they may not be under the same economic pressure to produce a profit
as a legal, legitimate business.

10

A contrasting example will further clarify the power of the traditional status system. Another community member,
who had done serious time in a U.S. jail for his illicit activities returned to Buenavista, lived quite well, but had no
visible means of support. He, like most everyone else, lived in a dense web of kinship and so went about his
business (whatever it was) fluidly and amicably. It is worth noting that he was very likeable and had a rather serious
interest in organic farming. We would occasionally get together over coffee and discuss what was happening with
the organic movement in the U.S. Again reminiscent of Scott (1985), I would later hear hushed scornful sidebar
comments about him, along with the suggestion that it was best not to be seen socializing with him.
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11

In this very conservative area, women were under the strong control of their parents. I came across a number of
examples of young women who were eager to go off to the university in the nearest big city. Few ever got the
chance. Many ended up working in the local wedding ornament industry or take on farming duties.
12

It is worth noting that multi-dimensional concept of “Banda Fuego” is not done justice when translated into
English. While the more literal translation of the term is “fire” or “fiery,” what is also alluded to is the notion of
combustion, gunfire, and violence.
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